VIRTUAL SYMPOSIUM

FOREWORD: THE RISE OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS
MAURICE E. STUCKE*
Many of you likely encountered law and economics in law school—perhaps in a
law and economics seminar or in a particular class, such as discussing efficient breach
in your contracts course. Some of you, however, had difficulty identifying with Homo
Economicus—namely, the rational, self-interested profit-maximizer who acts with great
willpower.
The economics literature over the past thirty years has moved beyond
neoclassical economic theory’s assumptions of perfectly rational market participants
who pursue, with willpower, their economic self-interest. These assumptions came
under attack from several interdisciplinary economic fields, most notably behavioral
economics.
Behavioral economics attempts to integrate psychologists’
understanding of human behavior into economic analysis. Over the past thirty years,
the economic literature increasingly recognized and measured when and how (i)
willpower is imperfect, (ii) people will incur costs to punish unfair behavior and care
about the fair treatment of others, and (iii) biases and heuristics affect decisionmaking.
Behavioral economics, the management consulting firm McKinsey & Company
recently observed, “is now mainstream.”1 Best-selling books feature behavioral
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economics,2 which is now a staple in graduate economics programs, business
schools, and, increasingly, law schools.
Behavioral economics, while popular before the economic crisis, is especially
relevant today. The economic crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak
regulation, moral hazard, and our lack of understanding about how many markets
actually operate. In 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) noted how “the worst financial and economic crisis in our
lifetime”3 has prompted policymakers to ask: “Are our economic theories, our
The Obama
economic models, and our assumptions still appropriate?”4
administration is considering the implications of behavioral economics in the areas
of health, finance, media, and law. The United Kingdom, among other countries, is
also turning to behavioral economics.5
Students at the University of Tennessee College of Law are also considering the
policy implications of behavioral economics, once one relaxes the assumptions of
rationality, willpower, and self-interest. How can the government incorporate
behavioral economics to model the impact of policy interventions? What is the role
of government if individuals make mistakes or have self-control problems that make
them act against their own well-being? What are the policy implications of
behavioral economics in the courtroom? What are the policy implications if firms
suffer biases and heuristics or if the government is relatively more or less rational
than market participants? What does behavioral economics add to (or take away
from) the policymaker’s toolkit?
Students in the behavioral law and economics seminar consider two overarching
concerns. The first is creeping authoritarianism. To protect its citizens, the
government places greater restrictions on the citizens’ ability to manage their affairs.
See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE O UR
DECISIONS (2008); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); RICHARD H. THALER
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
(2008).
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A bureaucracy that exists to protect its bounded rational citizens does not have much
incentive to improve the citizens’ bounded rationality and willpower. The
bureaucrats’ livelihood, authority, and status depend on citizens remaining
sufficiently irrational to justify the bureaucracy’s existence. Consumers are
encouraged to register their complaints with the government, which intercedes on
their behalf. The consumer complaints justify additional regulations to deter
behavioral exploitation. Inevitably, the heavily regulated firms become de facto state
enterprises. Under this worst-case scenario, economic competition and liberty cease
to be concerns.
The second concern develops if the government takes a laissez-faire approach.
Here the government renounces any intention to regulate the market, and a similar
anti-democratic outcome arises. Economically powerful firms lobby the government
to refrain from regulating the marketplace. While economically exploiting bounded
rational consumers, firms advocate the virtues of consumer sovereignty under a
laissez-faire approach. Under this ideology, markets are presumably efficient (or
heading toward greater efficiency). The government fails to address market failures
(or when it does act, it uses ineffective means to address the problem).
Thus our behavioral law and economics seminar navigates the risks of
behavioral exploitation, ineffective governmental policies, and the risks of sacrificing
economic freedom to an increasingly authoritarian government. Not surprisingly,
our discussions resulted in several interesting paper topics. In addition to Grant
Marshall's and Tyler Morgan's articles, the behavioral law and economics seminar
produced other interesting research:
• Olatayo Atanda looked at antitrust’s predatory pricing standard through a
behavioral economics lens;
• Caleb Barron examined how policymakers can use behavioral economics to
reduce income inequality in the United States;
• Nathaniel Dallas looked at how behavioral economics can better explain why
people choose to participate in crowdfunding;
• Matthew Delinko examined what the recent Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act does (and does not do) to combat smokers’ optimism
bias while Thomas Gossett explored how raising the cigarette taxes will
affect smoking;
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• Stephanie Epperson explored the relationship between economic freedom
and happiness;
• Henry Hildebrand considered the role of overconfidence bias in the student
loan default rate at for-profit universities;
• Jessica Jackson examined whether social norms were more effective than
financial incentives to tackle obesity;
• Brent Laman considered whether jurors were more likely to believe, and give
greater weight to, the testimony of physically attractive expert witnesses;
• Trevor McElhaney and Fred Pickney took a behavioral economics approach
to payday lending;
• Merrill F. Nelson, II considered the existence of Veblen effects in the Vidalia
onion industry;
• Michael Stahl considered the implications of behavioral economics on
program trading;
• Greg Talley explored the limitations of neoclassical economic theory in
explaining racial discrimination and how behavioral economics could
illuminate the discussion; and
• Alex Warner examined the infrequency of gym use and per-use gym
memberships and whether gyms were intentionally exploiting consumers’
bounded rationality and willpower.
The TRANSACTIONS editors selected for this Symposium two papers from my fall
2011 behavioral law and economics seminar and a third paper from the law and
economics seminar of my colleague, Professor Robert Lloyd.
N. Adam Dietrich, as part of Professor Lloyd’s seminar, examines regulatory
capture in his article, BP’s Deepwater Horizon: “The Goldman Sachs of the Sea,” and how
the oil and gas industry effectively captured the federal agency charged with
regulating offshore drilling in the outer continental shelf. Using the recent BP oil
spill, Adam explores the factors that contribute to regulatory capture and the extent
to which the BP oil spill is the result of the failures of big government. One
important factor, Adam points out, that made the federal agency susceptible to
industry influence, and ultimately a victim of regulatory capture, was the gradual
degeneration of the agency’s ethical culture.
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Grant Marshall, in his article, Hold the Mayo: Why Strong Deference to Treasury
Regulations Might Not Be Healthy, raises an interesting issue, namely whether behavioral
economics applies to governmental agencies. If firms and individuals suffer from
biases and heuristics, can governmental regulations also reflect (perhaps to different
degrees) these biases and heuristics? If so, to what extent should courts defer to the
agencies’ expertise? Moreover, Grant explores how administrative law (and the
degree of judicial deference) can be used to debias agency decision-making.
Tyler Morgan, in his article, The Refinancing Crisis in Commercial Real Estate:
Dodd-Frank Threatens to Curtail CMBS Lending, takes a behavioral economics
perspective on the subprime home mortgage crisis. He then examines whether these
concerns translate to the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market.
Tyler argues that the policy concerns behind the risk retention and mandatory
disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act do not exist in the CMBS market. Whereas behavioral economics
plays a role in one industry, Tyler discusses, it does not necessarily affect other
related industries.
The aim of the behavioral law and economics seminar and of this symposium
is not to hail behavioral economics as the elixir for today’s prevailing policy issues.
Instead the aim is to provide a glimpse of some of the current issues that our law
students are tackling in re-examining basic behavioral assumptions.

